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THE CALOOSAHATCHEE MASSACRE:
ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN THE SECOND
SEMINOLE WAR
by GEORGE R. ADAMS *
RECENT SCHOLARSHIP has put the Second Seminole War in itsproper place as one of the most dramatic episodes in the
period of Indian removal. The war was the longest, most ex-
pensive and most exhausting Indian conflict of the era. Hostili-
ties lasted from 1835 to 1842, and cost an estimated $40,000,000
while over 1,400 regular army troops and an indeterminable
number of militiamen, civilians, and Indians lost their lives in
the swamps and wilderness of Florida. 1 Guerrilla tactics, atroci-
ties, almost continual negotiation, generally undistinguished mil-
itary activity, frequent change of command, and conflict between
civilian and military authorities characterized the struggle.
At one point in the war, early 1839, federal sentiment for
relaxing the Seminole removal policy prompted the negotiation
of an armistice allowing the Indians to remain in southern
Florida. Concluded in May at Fort King in north central Flor-
ida, the agreement was not intended to be permanent, but the
government hoped it would calm the Florida situation and
lead to peaceful removal. Unfortunately for the federal plan,
citizens of Florida rejected even the prospect of a Seminole
reservation in the territory. This attitude and a lack of Indian
unity helped nullify the Fort King agreement. The most im-
portant single incident in the breakdown of the temporary
peace, however, was the Caloosahatchee massacre, the defeat of a
detachment of dragoons on July 23, 1839, on the shore of the
Caloosahatchee River. Occurring during a truce, the attack and
accompanying Seminole atrocities generated new hostilities
throughout Florida and increased the bitterness of the whites.
As had the armistice, the massacre brought protests and resent-
* Mr. Adams is a graduate student in history at the University of Arizona.
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ment from Floridians who thought that government and regular
army policies were too weak. They demanded that the military
use more militiamen to remove the Seminoles, and eventually
disagreement between federal and territorial officials led to the
dismissal of Florida Territorial Governor Richard Keith Call. 2
Furthermore, the Caloosahatchee defeat and renewed fighting
supplied a final impetus for a controversial experiment in the
use of bloodhounds against the Indians.
While historians have recognized the interrelationship of
these developments in the year 1839, they have neither appre-
ciated the full impact of the massacre nor told the complete
story of that fateful occasion. The Caloosahatchee River attack
was one of the most important military engagements in the Sec-
ond Seminole War because it helped prolong the conflict. In
addition, the attack is interesting because the events surround-
ing it exemplify the characteristics of the war.
The legality of the United States’ actions to remove the
Seminoles rested on agreements concluded with them on May
9, 1832, in the Treaty of Payne’s Landing, and on March 28,
1833, in the Treaty of Fort Gibson. 3 While these treaties passed
through the lengthy process of Senate ratification, the Indians
reconsidered and decided that the removal provisions were
unjust. Seminole chiefs balked at emigration, and late in 1835.
sporadic hostilities began. Full scale war erupted on December
28 of that year when Indian bands under Chief Osceola launched
two attacks fifty miles apart in central Florida. Initial army
efforts to subdue the Seminoles failed, and on November 4,
1836, the war department appointed Major General Thomas S.
Jesup commander of United States forces in Florida. The war
had been in progress only one year, but Jesup represented the
fourth attempt by the army to find a general who could defeat
the Indians. 
Jesup’s accomplishments far outweighed those of his prede-
cessors, for within eighteen months his troops captured almost
3,000 Seminoles. 4 Nevertheless, by early 1838 Jesup feared that
forceful removal would require years of combat, and he decided
2 .  Herber t  J .  Doher ty ,  J r . ,  R i c h a r d  K e i t h  C a l l :  S o u t h e r n  U n i o n i s t
(Gainesville, 1961), 114-17.
3. Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties (Washington,
1903), II, 290-91, 293-95.
4. Mahon, Second Seminole War, 99-106, 168, 182-92, 240.
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that the fighting should be stopped and the Indians allowed to
retain a part of southern Florida that was unsuitable for white
farmers. 5 Brigadier General Abraham Eustis and Colonel David
Twiggs, two of Jesup’s subordinates, first presented him with the
idea of abandoning Seminole removal, and they claimed that
most of their fellow officers supported it. 6 Unconfirmed evidence
indicates that the suggestion originated with Lieutenant Colonel
William S. Harney, an officer of the Second Dragoons, and that
he brought it to the attention of Eustis. 7 Whatever the case, in
February 1838, Jesup recommended to Secretary of War Joel R.
Poinsett that emigration be halted. Poinsett rejected the pro-
posal and replied that removal was the law of the land. There-
fore, he could not “authorize any arrangement with the Semi-
noles, by which they will be permitted to remain” anywhere in
Florida. 8
Two months later, in April 1838, the war department ac-
cepted Jesup’s request for a change of assignment, and the next
month he turned over his command to Brigadier General Zach-
ary Taylor. 9 During the next year,  Taylor instituted two
new military policies. First, in compliance with a war depart-
ment order designed to cut expenses, he disbanded most of the
Florida militia units which had participated in the campaign-
ing. Then he divided the territory north of the Withlacoochee
River into twenty mile square sectors and placed a twenty-man
garrison of regular army troops in each. When Indian depreda-
tions continued, Florida citizens and officials alike complained
that Taylor’s actions had failed. In particular, Floridians con-
sidered the reduction of militia forces an explanation for con-
tinued Indian attacks. Perhaps the citizens’ attitude also
stemmed from the usual frontiersmen’s anti-Indian prejudice
and from a desire to remain on the federal payroll. Certainly
the civilian suppliers and others who had profited economically
5. Thomas S. Jesup to Joel R. Poinsett, February 11, 1838, in John T.
Sprague, The Origin, Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida War
(New York, 1848; facsimile reprint, Gainesville, 1964), 199-201.
6. Jesup to Poinsett, July 6, 1838, in Sprague, Florida War, 184-97.
7. L. U. Reavis, The Life and Military Services of General William Selby
Harney (St. Louis, 1878), 124-26.
8. Jesup to Poinsett, February 11, 1838, and Poinsett to Jesup, March 1,
1838, in Sprague, Florida War, 199-202.
9. Jesup to Poinsett, July 25, 1837, in Sprague, Florida War, 180-81.
3
Adams: Caloosahatchee Massacre: Its Significance in the Second Seminole
Published by STARS, 1969
CALOOSAHATCHEE  MASSACRE 371
from the war detested the economy measures imposed
lor’s quartermaster. 10
by Tay-
Conditions changed little during Taylor’s first year in com-
mand, and therefore, by March 1839, Secretary of War Poinsett
decided to postpone removal in an effort to reduce or end
hostilities. To accomplish this he sent Alexander Macomb,
commanding general of the army, to Florida and directed him
to do what he thought necessary to stop the fighting and to
10. Mahon, Second Seminole War, 247, 249-54.
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protect the citizens. Poinsett informed General Macomb that
Congress had appropriated funds for reopening negotiations
with the Seminoles, and he ordered him to arrange a truce.
Once the Indians agreed to talk, Macomb was to convince them
to occupy a part of southwestern Florida until removal could
be completed under terms of the Treaty of Payne’s Landing. 11
On April 5, 1839, General Macomb arrived at Garey’s Ferry
on Black Creek southwest of Jacksonville. There he conferred
with General Taylor, who now also believed that the Indians
could be pacified only if they were allowed to remain in Florida.
The following day Macomb wrote Colonel Harney at Fort
Mellon, about 100 miles south at Lake Monroe, to communicate
with the Seminoles and request a meeting at Fort King. Harney
talked with Chief Chitto Tustenuggee (Snake Warrior) and per-
suaded him to go to Fort King where another chief, Halleck
Tustenuggee (Potato Warrior), joined him. On May 18 Gen-
eral Macomb held a council with the chiefs and arranged an
unwritten peace agreement. This required the Indians to remain
in an area below Pease Creek, roughly the southwestern quarter
of the peninsula.1 2 In the negotiations Macomb did not mention
emigration to the Seminoles because he wanted to leave that
subject open to any future stipulations the government might
wish to make. He promised only that fighting would stop if
the Indians would withdraw to the prescribed area and that
they could remain there in safety “until further arrangements
could be made.” Whether the Seminoles interpreted the agree-
ment as permanent or as temporary cannot be determined, but
those present at the council expressed satisfaction with the
armistice. 13 Unfortunately, at least four bands of hostiles did
not participate in the Fort King talks. Nevertheless, on May 20,
Macomb proclaimed a cessation of hostilities and outlined the
boundaries of the Seminole territory. 14
Poinsett to Alexander Macomb, March 18, 1839, in Clarence E. Carter,
ed., Territorial Papers of the United States: Florida Territory, 26 vols.
(Washington, 1956-1962) XXV, 597-99.
Entries April 5, April 6, May 17, May 18, and May 22, 1839, in John T.
Sprague, “Macomb’s Mission to the Seminoles: John T. Sprague’s
Journal Kept During April and May, 1839,” edited by Frank F. White,
Jr., Florida Historical Quarterly, XXXV (October 1956), 144-46, 176-81,
183-87.
Macomb to Poinsett, May 22, 1839, in Sprague, Florida War, 229-32.
Mahon, Second Seminole War, 258; Macomb Order, May 18, 1839, in
Sprague, Florida War, 228-29.
5
Adams: Caloosahatchee Massacre: Its Significance in the Second Seminole
Published by STARS, 1969
CALOOSAHATCHEE  MASSACRE 373
Then the general returned to Washington, thinking that he
had made a significant contribution toward a peaceful settle-
ment of the Seminole problem. The Washington Globe an-
nounced that the Indians had been pacified and no more blood
would be spilled in Florida. 15 There were two factors, however,
which Macomb and the Globe had not considered: public
opinion in Florida and the disunity of the Seminoles. These
negated Macomb’s accomplishments.
The Fort King agreement enraged Floridians who feared
it was permanent. People in Florida, the St. Augustine News
insisted, should unite to protest the agreement. The paper
castigated the federal government for stooping to the role of
“supplicants for peace” and insisted that the Treaty of Payne’s
Landing be enforced. 16 The Tallahassee Floridian denounced
the armistice as insane and called on the people to shoot Indians
on sight. 17 Tallahassee citizens held a public meeting, adopted
resolutions of remonstration, and sent copies to various officials,
including the President and the secretary of war. On June 22,
1839, however, the Floridian dispelled much of this fear and
anger by printing an extract of a letter from Secretary of War
Poinsett to a local citizen. The secretary’s official position thus
became public record. He expected Macomb’s arrangement to
lead to pacification of the territory and enable the removal of
the Seminoles sooner than if force was used. 16
It is impossible to determine the exact effect of this news
on the Indians, but prior to the time that they learned the con-
tents of Poinsett’s letter, most of them tried to avoid clashes with
the troops. 19 This seems to indicate that at least some of the
Seminoles thought that the Fort King agreement was permanent.
Of course, sporadic fighting continued with Indian bands which
had not participated in the negotiations. Whatever the Indians
believed they had been promised by General Macomb at Fort
King, once Secretary Poinsett’s letter appeared in the Floridian
there could be no further question. Removal was inevitable.
Even though lack of evidence and the division among the
Seminoles prevent placing blame for the renewed hostilities
15. Washington Globe, May 30, 1839.
16. St. Augustine News, May 25, June 1, 1839.
17. Mahon, Second Seminole War, 257.
18. Niles’ National Register, June 22, July 6, 1839.
19. Mahon, Second Seminole War, 258-61.
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squarely on the publication of the letter, it must have been
partly responsible. Depredations occurred on July 17 when
Indians murdered three members of the Chaires family near
Tallahassee, and ten days later when they ambushed a small
army wagon train traveling to Fort Andrews in central Florida. 20
Such acts of violence undermined chances for peace, but no
event had a more damaging effect than the Caloosahatchee
massacre.
The Fort King agreement provided that a trading house be
established for Indian use on the Caloosahatchee near the center
of the reservation. Macomb ordered Colonel Harney, who had
participated in the negotiations at Fort King and had a good
reputation as an Indian fighter, to build the post. 21  Macomb
instructed him to proceed to Tampa Bay and call on General
Taylor for support troops. Enroute by steamboat to Taylor’s
headquarters, Harney made a side trip up the Caloosahatchee to
select a site for the trading house. There, about fifteen miles up
river on the north shore, he left his detachment of twenty-eight
dismounted dragoons under the command of Sergeant John
Bigelow and continued on to Tampa Bay alone. Harney asked
Taylor for two companies of men for guard duty, but much to
his chagrin, the general asserted that he had no troops available
for such duty. In fact, he refused to provide any officers or
men. 22 Taylor’s claim may have been valid, but nevertheless his
refusal to enlarge Harney’s command meant that the small work
detail remained an inviting target for Indian attack. Certainly,
had Harney’s detail been reinforced as he requested, the war-
riors who later attacked his camp might well have been afraid
to engage the troops there. 23
While at Tampa Bay, Harney chose James B. Dallam, a
soldier interested in performing a “handsome” service, as trader
for the new post. The two departed for the Caloosahatchee
on June 19 and upon arrival decided to erect the trading house
20. Niles’ National Register, August 10, 1839.
21. Mahon, Second Seminole War, 261-62.
22. William S. Harney to Francis L. Dancy, August 1, 1839, in Theophilus
Rodenbough, From Everglade to Canon with the Second Dragoons
(New York, 1875), 38-39; Reavis, Harney, 134; William C. Sturtevant,
“Chakaika and the ‘Spanish Indians’: Documentary Sources Compared
with Seminole Tradition,” Tequesta, No. 13 (1953), 46.
23. Mahon, Second Seminole War, 262.
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about 400 yards from the dragoons’ bivouac. 24 During the next
month, Harney spent most of his time on trips to Tampa Bay
and Cape Florida, his own base, while nearby Indians made
frequent visits to Dallam’s trading post. They traded, seemed
friendly to the troops, and voiced satisfaction with the truce.
No definite motive can be ascertained for the Indians’ apparent
change of mind and subsequent attack on the post, but it is
possible that the Poinsett letter published on June 22 sparked
feelings of bitterness and a desire to seek revenge for the Fort
King negotiations. News of the letter arrived in the Tampa Bay
area two days before the massacre, and within that time Indian
runners could have spread the message throughout their camps
in southwest Florida. The band which committed the offense
had not participated in the Fort King council, but they profited
from the agreement. Because Harney had persuaded Chitto
Tustenuggee to attend the talks at Fort King, he was a logical
target for their vengeance, and if Sampson, one of two Negro
interpreters at the trading post, may be believed, the Indians
planned to kill Harney. Moreover, the attackers spared Samp-
son’s life, but they burned the other Negro, Sandy, who had
been an interpreter at the Fort King meeting, at the stake. 25
Harney left Tampa Bay only hours before news of the
Poinsett letter arrived. Thus he was unaware of the changed
situation when he reached the trading post on the evening of
July 21, 1839, and he made no special plans for its defense. The
next morning the steamboat which had brought him from
Tampa Bay departed for Cape Florida, and the colonel rode it
to the mouth of the river where he spent all day hunting wild
hogs for the solders’ mess. It was ten o’clock at night when the
exhausted officer returned to camp. The usually dependable
Sergeant Bigelow had been left in charge again, and Harney,
having faith in Bigelow’s judgment, decided to rest before
24. James B. Dallam to Francis J. Dallam, June 18, 1839, in William D.
Hoyt, Jr., ed., “A Soldier’s View of the Seminole War: Three Letters
of James B. Dallam,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XXV (April 1947),
360-61.
25. Harney to Dancy, August 1, 1839, in Rodenbough, Second Dragoons,
38-39; Reavis, Harney, 134-37; Sturtevant, “Chakaika,” 46-47; “Sampson’s
Recollection” in Sprague, Florida War, 316-19. Sampson presented his
recol lec t ion  of  the  massacre  af te r  he  escaped f rom two years  of
captivity, and some of his story contradicts other accounts. He stated,
for instance, that the trading post was established in December 1839.
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checking the sentinels. He removed his coat, boots, and pants,
and fell asleep unintentionally. 26
About daylight, rifle shots and yelling Indians suddenly
awakened Harney. When the commander bounded out of his
tent, he saw a scene of disaster. A force of approximately 160
Indians led principally by Chakaika, chief of the so-called Span-
ish Indians, had attacked the camp and store, and amid shouts
of “run to the water,” the troops fled to the river. There they
presented poor targets to the attackers, but they could not
escape by swimming across the Caloosahatchee because Indians
lined both banks. Wisely disregarding his lack of clothes, the
colonel started for the river to join his men. Then at the water’s
edge he saw that the soldiers were unarmed. Corporal Haywood,
a survivor of the massacre, later reported that a non-commis-
sioned officer [probably Bigelow] had neglected to pass out
ammunition for the dragoons’ new Colt rifles. Thus when the
attack began, the soldiers had simply thrown the weapons aside.
Realizing that he could be of no use to two dozen unarmed men
against scores of Indians, Harney decided to save himself and
ran downstream along the shore. After proceeding about a
quarter of a mile, he entered the river. A few paces down he
went ashore again and, in an attempt to cover his trail, walked
out of the water backward.
Meanwhile the Seminoles tried to entice the dragoons out
of the river. One warrior who could speak English called to
Sergeant Bigelow to bring his men ashore and promised that
they would not be harmed. But when Bigelow and eight others
consequently surrendered, the Indians murdered and disem-
boweled most of them and held the others captive. Seven or
eight men who had remained in the water swam downstream
and, after rounding a point, boarded a fishing sloop anchored
there. At least three other soldiers, including Corporal Hay-
wood, hid in the swamp and woods until the raid ended. Hay-
wood then made his way to the coast, but the other two re-
mained hidden until a burial detail rescued them several days
later. Trader Dallam and his assistant, Mr. Morgan, were not
so fortunate. They died in their bunks, victims of Indians who
26. “Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army,” Senate
Documents, 26 Cong., 1st Sess., No. 1, p. 58; Harney to Dancy, August
1, 1839, in Rodenbough, Second Dragoons, 38-39; Reavis, Harney, 137.
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looted the store. The attackers took Sergeant Simmons, the two
Negro interpreters, and a post carpenter prisoners and tortured
all of them, except Sampson, to death. 27 Thirteen soldiers and
three civilians died. 28
The confusion of the onslaught and the Indians’ pre-
occupation with plundering and with the troops in the water
gave Harney time to escape. Leaving the river, he set out for
the coast armed merely with a pocket knife and wearing only
his shirt ,  underwear,  and socks.  He had gone but a short
distance when he met Private Britton, a dragoon who presum-
ably fled when the attack began. The two men resumed their
trek together, and after periodic reconnaissance of the Caloosa-
hatchee shore, they found Harney’s canoe which had drifted
downstream. The fugitives used the boat to reach the mouth of
the river where they met the sloop in which several men had
escaped the attack on the trading post. With the vessel was
another sloop, the Jane, which had come down the coast from
Tampa Bay. 
Reunited with some of his dragoons, Harney acted on his
first impulse to return to the scene of the disaster. At the camp
he found only mangled corpses, for the two men hiding in the
brush feared an Indian trick and remained hidden. Lacking
necessary force to pursue the Indians and afraid to remain long
in that vicinity in the middle of the night, the outraged colonel
dispatched one sloop to Tampa Bay and proceeded in the other
to his Cape Florida headquarters. 29  The burial party which
27. “Sergeant Haywood’s Recollection,” in Rodenbough, Second Dragoons,
504-05; “Sampson’s Recollection” in Sprague, Florida War, 316-19;
Niles’ National Register, August 24, 1839.
28. Rodenbough, Second Dragoons, 431; Sturtevant, “Chakaika,” 46-47.
There is some confusion about the number of men killed. Sturtevant
(p. 46) states that thirteen were killed and six captured, three of the
latter being murdered while in captivity, thus making a total of six-
teen deaths. Reavis (p. 146) notes thirteen killed in the fighting. A
report in Niles’ National Register on August 10, 1839, also states that
thirteen were killed, including two sutlers. On the other hand, Roden-
bough (p. 431) cites eleven soldiers killed. As for the number of soldiers
who died, these latter two sources agree. A Niles’ National Register re-
port on August 24, 1839, however, states that eleven bodies were found
mutilated, but it does not note whether this was the total number of
deaths. Therefore, if the executed prisoners are counted along with
those killed in the fighting,. most evidence supports the conclusion that
sixteen died as an immediate result of the attack.
29. Anonymous Letter, July 22, 1839, in Rodenbough, Second Dragoons, 37.
(Although dated July 22, 1839, this letter apparently was written on the
evening of July 23 on board the Jane.) See also Reavis, Harney, 139-41.
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arrived at the massacre site two weeks later discovered the two
men who were hiding and Romeo, a dog which had belonged
to James Dallam. Originally the property of Harney, the dog
must have stood guard over Dallam’s corpse, for it was the
only one untouched by wolves or vultures. 30
The Caloosahatchee massacre wrecked the uneasy truce.
Within days of the event bloody hostilities recommenced, and
all hope for a conclusion of the war in 1839 collapsed. When
news of the defeat reached Fort Mellon on July 31, Lieutenant
W. E. Hanson seized forty-six Seminoles who were there pro-
curing supplies. These Indians knew about the massacre but
thought that the soldiers did not. Two of the group tried to
escape, and the troops killed both. 31  On August 3 headlines
in the St. Augustine News proclaimed the war reopened, and
on August 10 Niles' National Register pleaded for the govern-
ment to “take some decided measures to expel the savage mur-
derers.” 32 Later in the same month the war department requested
General Taylor to authorize the governor of Florida to raise 300
militiamen, but these few additional men did not significantly
aid efforts to defeat the Seminoles. 3 3 In October, military efforts
were accelerated after General Macomb urged that all available
forces be employed in the war. 34
In the meantime, Taylor captured approximately 200 In-
dians and offered to release them if their chiefs would surrender
the band responsible for the Caloosahatchee River attack. The
already agitated Florida citizens, supported by the Tallahassee
Floridian, decried this policy as soft; the Floridian claimed
that Taylor was incompetent. 35 Then Governor Call demanded
that he be entrusted with the conduct of the war, and this
intensified the already “unfriendly feelings” between regular
troops and civilian authorities. The cooperation necessary for
30. Rodenbough, Second Dragoons, 39; St. Augustine News, August 30,
1839.
31. George H. Griffen to W. E. Hanson, July 29, 1839, in Niles’ National
Register, August 10, 1889; Reavis, Harney, 142-43; Savannah Weekly
Georgian, August 17, 1839.
32. St. Augustine News, August 3, 1839; Niles’ National Register, August
10, 1839.
33. Samuel Cooper to Zachary Taylor, August 30, 1839, Carter, Territorial
Papers, XXV, 634.
34. Macomb to Taylor, October 17, 1839, Carter, Territorial Papers, XXV,
643; “Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army,” 59.
35. Mahon, Second Seminole War, 263-64.
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increased military operations seemed impossible to obtain.
Secretary of War Poinsett blamed Call for the difficulties, and
in a November letter to President Van Buren the secretary pre-
dicted that Call’s desire to have the whole command and his
insistence on raising a militia under territorial authority would
result in much expense for the federal government and reduce
the efficiency of the war effort. Poinsett requested that Call be
removed as governor, and Van Buren agreed. The President
endorsed Poinsett’s letter with a note stating that Judge Robert
Raymond Reid of St. Augustine should supersede Call. 36
While officials in Washington considered Call’s dismissal, he
set in motion another series of events which produced more
controversy. Under authority of the Florida legislature, Call sent
militia Colonel Richard Fitzpatrick to Cuba late in 1839 to
purchase a number of bloodhounds to use against the Seminoles.
The possibility of using these animals had long been discussed
because the authorities knew that over the past 150 years
Jamaican officials had utilized Cuban bloodhounds during slave
revolts to track Negroes. 37 In the summer of 1837 General Jesup
had argued unconvincingly that the army needed bloodhounds
to facilitate removal, and in the summer of 1838 General Taylor
made a similar plea. 38 Nevertheless, only after the Caloosa-
hatchee massacre and the resumption of full scale war did any-
one in authority take steps to procure the hounds. When Fitz-
patrick returned with thirty-three dogs, Taylor and the Flori-
dians finally had something about which they could ageee.
Congress and the northern press, however, felt that use of the
vicious dogs would be inhumane. Secretary Poinsett refused to
yield to popular pressure to ban experiments with the blood-
hounds, but he did direct Taylor to order his officers to keep
the dogs muzzled and leashed in the field and use them only for




Poinsett to Martin Van Buren, November 29, 1839, Carter, Territorial
Papers, XXV, 656-57. There seems to be some question in Carter con-
cerning the spelling of Reed or Reid, but the latter is correct.
Arthur L. Magenis to Poinsett, February 8, 1840, Senate Documents,
26 Cong., 1st Sess., No. 187, pp. 2-3; James W. Covington, “Cuban
Bloodhounds and the Seminoles,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XXXIII
(October 1954), 112.
Jesup to Poinsett ,  June 16, 1837, American State Papers: Mili tary
Affairs, VII, 876; Taylor to Roger Jones, July 28, 1839, Senate Docu-
ments, 26 Cong., 1st Sess., No. 187, p. 3.
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for unknown reasons, the canines’ handlers could not induce
them to follow the Seminoles’ scent. 39
On April 21, 1840, Taylor received permission to give up
the Florida command to Brigadier General Walker K. Armi-
stead but he, too, failed to stop the depredations. Bringing the
war to a close required an additional two and one-half years of
fighting and negotiating, more expenditures of lives and dollars,
and still another change of command. 40 These additional months
of hostilities would not have been necessary if the arrangements
Macomb made at Fort King had succeeded. For a brief period
in 1839 there had been a hope, even a possibility, that tempers
would cool and the government would find a peaceful means of
ending the war, but the Caloosahatchee massacre destroyed that
hope by breaking the truce and producing new fighting.
39. Covington, “Cuban Bloodhounds,” 112-19; Poinsett to Taylor, January
26, 1840, Senate Documents, 26 Cong., 1st Sess., No. 187, p. 5.
40. Mahon, Second Seminole War, 274, 294, 314-18.
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